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ARGUMENT
I.

CANYON ROAD TOWERS MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE ENTERED
INTO A VALID AND ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT WHICH WAS NOT
ILLEGAL AND NOT UNENFORCEABLE UNDER THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS.
A. The agreement between Canyon Road Towers Management Committee
and Johannessens contained all the elements of a valid and enforceable
contract.
Appellees (hereinafter "Canyon Road Towers") contend that the agreement between

Canyon Road Towers Management Committee and Appellants (hereinafter "Johannessens") is
not valid or enforceable upon the grounds that the Management Committee was not a proper
party and that the agreement lacked sufficient consideration. Generally, in Utah, a valid and
enforceable contract requires proper parties having mutual consent and consideration. Auqugen
International Inc., v. Calrae Trust. 972 p.2d 411, 413 (Utah 1998). To determine if parties
entered into an enforceable contract, a court should consider all preliminary negotiations, offers,
and counter offers and interpret the various expressions of the parties for the purpose of deciding
whether the parties reached agreement on the terms. Nunlev v. Westates Casing Services, Inc.,
989 P.2d 1077, 1084 (Utah 1999). In this case, the Management Committee had capacity to
enter into the subject contract and said contract is supported by valid consideration.
Canyon Road Towers asserts that the Management Committee were not "proper parties
with the required capacity" to enter into the subject contract without unit owners vote or consent.
However, Canyon Road Towers fails to provide any definition of "proper parties with the
required capacity." Canyon Road Towers does not argue that the Management Committee some
how lacked sufficient mental capacity to contract in general, but merely argues that the
Committee lacked sufficient authority to contract as it did.
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The Management Committee had not only the mental capacity to contract, but had the
express authority to enter into contracts pursuant to the governing documents. (Declaration of
Condominium If 12; R. at 25-27). Furthermore, the Association's Declaration of Condominium
states that any person who in good faith and for value relies on a written instrument (in this case
the association's written minutes and its subsequent dealings) may conclusively rely on the
power of the management committee to act (See Declaration of Condominium ^f 12(a)(9); R. at
26). Canyon Road Tower's argument that the Committee was not a proper party, or lacked
capacity, is merely a reiteration of its argument that the contract is invalid as contrary to the Utah
Condominium Act. Johannessens disagree with Canyon Road Tower's assertions, and address
said arguments further herein.
Canyon Road Tower's assertion that the parties' contract lacked valid consideration is
also invalid. Generally, to have a valid consideration, each party must be obligated to confer a
benefit upon the other or suffer a detriment at the other's request. Manwill v. Ovler, 361 P.2d
177, 178 (Utah 1961). Furthermore, consideration may also be supplied by promissory estoppel.
Talboe Construction Co. v. Staker Paving & Construction Co., 682 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1984).
In this case, both parties benefited from a bargained for exchange, thus supplying the
necessary consideration.

The consideration upon which the agreement was based includes

Johannessens' lowered assessment and Canyon Road Towers gaining the benefit of a duespaying owner. As a practical matter, the one time that the association faces risk by loss on dues
is when a first mortgage lender forecloses on a unit. This was in jeopardy of occurring in unit P9
prior to Johannessens' purchase because the unit was in foreclosure. (Johannessen Aff. R. at
105, Seely Aff. R. at 252). The association knew that unit P9 was very difficult to market
because of the abnormally high dues. Id_ They sought a solution by lowering the assessment
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and subsidizing the dues to solve an ongoing problem. Id. Therefore, each party to the contract
sustained a benefit therefrom.
Even if the Management Committee did not receive a sufficient benefit from their
bargained for exchange, consideration is supplied by promissory estoppel.

Generally,

promissory estoppel provides a substitute for consideration. Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, Inc.,
948 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1997). The Utah Supreme Court defines promissory estoppel as "a
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part
of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance." Talboe
Construction Co. v. Staker Paving & Construction Co., 682 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1984) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Contracts 90). In such circumstances, a promise "is binding if injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." IcL In Utah four elements are necessary to
show promissory estoppel:
(1) The Plaintiff acted with prudence and in reasonable reliance on a promise
made by the Defendant; (2) the Defendant knew that the plaintiff had relied on the
promise which the defendant should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the party of the plaintiff or a third person; (3) the Defendant was
aware of all material facts; and (4) the Plaintiff relied on the promise and the
reliance resulted in a loss to the Plaintiff.
Nunlev v. Westates Casing Services. 989 P.2d 1077, 1088 (Utah 1999).
Each of the elements promissory estoppel has been conclusively established herein.
Canyon Road Towers argues that Johannessens did not act with prudence and in reasonable
reliance because they had constructive knowledge of the Declaration of Condominium.
Johannessens herein did act with prudence and in reasonable reliance on Canyon Road Tower's
promise to lower the assessment on the unit they were purchasing by making such an
accommodation part of their purchase contract. Johannessens acted reasonably in relying upon
the promise given that the promise was reflected in both the purchase agreement and the Minutes
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for December 10, 1992, of the Homeowners Association Board, (Johannessen Aff.;R. at 105106, Seely Aff., R. at 252). Johannessens had no reason to question the Committee's ability to
contract and subsidize their monthly assessment as the governing documents specifically give the
Committee the power to so contract and establishes conclusively that Johannessens had a right to
rely upon the Committee's power to so contract. (Declaration of Condominium Tf 12; R. at 2527, Transcript P 25-26, R. at 360-361.) Canyon Road Towers certainly knew that Johannessens
relied upon the promise and that the promise would reasonably induce Johannessens to purchase
the subject property as the Minutes for December 10, 1992, of the Owners Association's Board
state specifically that the Board was fully aware that the lowered assessment was a condition of
Johannessens purchasing the unit. (Johannessen Aff. Ex. B; R. at 109, Seely Aff., R at 253).
Canyon Road Towers was fully aware of all of the material facts surrounding the agreement and
it is reasonable that they would expect Johannessens to purchase the unit in reliance upon their
promise. Id. The reasonableness of Johannessens' reliance is supported by the Declaration of
Condominium itself, which provides that the management committee's writings conclusively
establish the association's power to act. (Declaration of Condominium ^ 12(a)(9); R. at 26.)
Finally, as specifically found by the trial court, Johannessens relied upon the contract to their
detriment. (Transcript P26, R. at 361.) Johannessens relied upon the promise and purchased the
unit, only to have the promise taken away long after the purchase. As a result, Johannessens'
property value is severely diminished through the stigma of an unreasonably high monthly
assessment and Johannessens will otherwise bear the burden of paying the unreasonably high
monthly assessment in perpetuity.
It is undisputed that Canyon Road Towers entered into an agreement with Johannessens
to lower the assessment on their condominium in connection with Johannessens's purchase of
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unit P9. Canyon Road Towers merely asserts that the agreement is not enforceable. However,
Johannessens detrimentally relied upon Canyon Road Tower's agreement to reduce the
assessment on unit P9 upon Johannessens' purchasing this condominium unit. For this reason,
under the principal of equity, Canyon Road Towers is estopped from breaching the agreement, or
arguing that the agreement lacks sufficient consideration, under the doctrine of promissory
estoppel.
B. The Agreement between Johannessens and Canyon Road Towers
Management Committee is not barred by the Statute of Frauds.

Canyon Road Towers contends that any agreement between Johannessens and the
Management Committee could not be performed within one year, is not supported by a sufficient
writing, and is, therefore, void under the statute of frauds. Generally, agreements which may not
be performed within one year must be in writing to be enforceable. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4.
The agreement herein was supported by a writing containing the essential terms of the
contract sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Indeed, this agreement is supported by
numerous writings. The minutes of the management committee are a sufficient writing and are
signed by the party to be charged. It should be noted that during the management committees'
deliberations, Johannessens were regularly negotiating the matter with the Committee's then
President, Glen Seely.

(Seely Aff, R. at 251-253).

When the committee came back to

Johannessens with the figure of $416 monthly, in writing, Johannessens were in agreement.
(Johannessen Aff, R. at 106, Seely Aff, R. at 252). The agreement was that the assessment on
Unit P9 would be calculated according to the same assessment for the two units directly beneath
Unit P9, which would have been $546, less one maintenance fee and one reserve fee, as this was
only one unit. (Seely Aff, R. at 252). Therefore, the agreement is supported by a signed writing
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containing all the essential terms to support a permanent reduction of the fees on unit P9.
Subsequent writings have confirmed the existence of a contract. On February 14, 1997, Canyon
Road Towers sent Johannessens a letter acknowledging that they had previously entered into an
agreement for Johannessens to pay a reduced fee. (Johannessen Aff, R. at 271). Furthermore,
the Minutes of the Management Committee Meeting dated September 10, 1996 recognizes that
the management committee reduced Johannessens fee "as an inducement for them to buy the
special penthouse unit." Id. at 273. Therefore, sufficient writings exist, signed by Canyon Road
Towers, to satisfy the Statute of Frauds in this case.
Even if sufficient writings did not exist, this contract is not subject to the Statute of
Frauds due to part performance. The Statute of Frauds does not limit the powers of this Court to
enforce contracts where there has been part performance. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-8. Generally,
"an otherwise invalid agreement may be enforced through a court's equitable prerogatives if a
party, relying on the oral agreement, partially performs its contractual obligations" as part
performance.

Jenkins v. PercivaL 962 P.2d 796, 801 (Utah 1998).

The doctrine of part

performance is meant "to prevent an overly rigid adherence to the statute from becoming the
means of perpetrating a fraud." Id.
Johannessens herein relied upon Canyon Road Tower's representations in purchasing
their unit. (Johannessen Aff., R. at 105, Seely Aff, R. at 253, Johannessen Aff. R. at 273).
Johannessens further showed their reliance, and partly performed, by continuing to pay the
agreed-upon assessment for over 4 years, which the Association accepted without complaint.
Even if the agreement lacks a sufficient writing, Johannessens' part performance takes this
matter outside the statute of frauds.
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C. The agreement between Johannessens and the Management Committee is not illegal.
Canyon Road Towers asserts that the contract which is the subject matter of this suit is
illegal and void upon the grounds that the Management Committee may not adjust ownership
percentages among unit owners without the owners' authorization pursuant to the Utah
Condominium Act. Canyon Road Tower's argument is seriously flawed upon two grounds; (1)
that the agreement did not seek to adjust ownership percentages, but rather sought a subsidy of
the assigned association fee, and (2) Canyon Road Towers seeks to interpose a defense based
upon their ultra vires acts.
Canyon Road Towers correctly cites Utah law as requiring unanimous consent of the
homeowners to adjust the ownership percentages. However, Johannessens and Canyon Road
Towers did not seek to adjust ownership percentages by virtue of their agreement to lower the
assessment on Unit P9. Rather, Canyon Road Towers agreed to subsidize the unreasonably large
assessment on that unit to assist in the sale. The declaration and bylaws do not specifically
restrict the committee's ability to provide such subsidy. Therefore, Canyon Road Towers is
bound by such contract. Section 12 of the Canyon Road Towers Declaration of Condominium
grants the Management Committee authority to contract and perform any other acts and to enter
into any other transactions which may be reasonably necessary for the Management Committee
to perform its functions as agent of the Unit Owners. (Declaration of Condominium, ^| 12, R. at
25-27).
Canyon Road Tower's argument that the committee lacked capacity to contract also fails
upon the ground that ultra vires is not a proper defense. As provided herein, Canyon Road
Towers may not now invalidate the previous agreement by claiming it was an ultra vires act. (See
Section III at page 9 for expanded discussion.)
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II.

JOHANNESSENS ARE NOT ESTOPPED FROM ARGUING THE
EXISTENCE OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES BY THE
THEORY OF ESTOPPEL BY DEED.
Canyon Road Towers asserts that Johannessens are estopped from claiming their

condominium unit is subject to a lower assessment than propounded in the Declaration of
Condominium, as their deed referred directly to the Declaration. Canyon Road Towers supports
this theory by the doctrine of estoppel by deed. Generally, an estoppel by deed prevents a party
from enjoying the benefits of a deed while at the same time rejecting the burdens. 28 Am. Jur.
2d Estoppel and Waiver §13. However, "Strictly speaking, estoppel by deed does not ordinarily
apply to the grantee." Id. Estoppel by deed is "generally limited to an action on the deed itself;
in a collateral action, there is ordinarily no estoppel." Id. At §4.
Canyon Road Towers cite Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983), as support for
their position on estoppel by deed. However, the Hall decision is not based upon the doctrine of
estoppel by deed and merely mentions the theory in dicta. Id. at 228.
Estoppel by deed is inapplicable to Johannessens herein. First, Johannessens are not
suing upon the deed itself, rather Canyon Road Towers are suing upon a collateral contract to the
real estate transaction. Second, estoppel by deed requires that Johannessens be claiming some
benefit under the deed and simultaneously reject the burden of the deed. Johannessens herein
have asserted no benefit of the deed in this action, but have only rejected a particular burden that
Canyon Road Towers agreed to subsidize. Consequently, the theory of estoppel by deed is
inapplicable to Johannessens in this case.
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III.

CANYON ROAD TOWERS MAY NOT NOW AVOID THEIR PRIOR ACTS
UPON THE GROUNDS THAT SAID ACTS ARE ULTRA VIRES.
Canyon Road Towers argues that the Board had no power to lower the dues, absent

compliance with the Utah Condominium Act. When a corporation acts without any capacity,
power, or authorization to complete the act, the act is termed ultra vires. However, no act of a
non-profit corporation is invalid solely because it is ultra vires. Utah Code Ann. §16-6-23. Utah
Code Ann. §16-6-23 provides:
No act of nonprofit corporation and no conveyance or transfer of
real or personal property to or by such a corporation shall be
invalid by reason of the fact that the corporation was without
capacity or power to do such act or to make or receive such
conveyance or transfer . . .

Generally, this statute has been interpreted to limit the ultra vires defense and to lend
credence to agreements where parties contracted with the corporation in good faith without
knowledge of the corporate authorization. Park v. Aha Ditch & Canal Co., 458 P.2d 625, 628
(Utah 1969). Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 588 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("the primary
purpose of section 16-6-23, as evidenced by the section's plain language, is to eliminate a
corporation's ability to avoid its obligations to third parties by raising a defense of ultra vires").
Canyon Road Towers further asserts that it is absurd to claim that a corporation could
enter into an agreement contrary to Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-7 and have the "illegal" contract
enforced by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-23, which limits Ultra Vires defenses. But is it not
also absurd to assert that a corporation may assert an Ultra Vires defense in such a case despite
Utah Code Ann. §16-6-23? To concede Canyon Road Towers argument that their contract,
which they do not deny entering into, is unenforceable as being "illegal" would give absolutely
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no meaning or force to Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-23 which limits the Ultra Vires defense. It is
doubtful that the legislature enacted said statute with the intent that it would have no force,
meaning, or effect.
Johannessens contracted with Canyon Road Towers Corporation in good faith, believing
that it had authority to lower the assessment on their unit. Regardless of whether Canyon Road
Towers Corporation had said authority, they may not now avoid their contractual responsibility
merely because the entity lacked corporate authority to so contract. Canyon Road Tower's
assertion that the contract should not be upheld because it is illegal is misplaced. Regardless of
the Condominium Ownership Act, there is nothing prohibiting Canyon Road Towers from
entering into a contract to subsidize a particular unit. Because Utah Code Ann. 16-6-23 limits
the ultra vires defense, Canyon Road Towers is bound by their agreement even if the corporation
lacked authority to contract to lower the assessment.
IV. THE AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID JOHANNESSEN IS SUPPORTED BY
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE, IS NOT CONCLUSORY, IS NOT ARGUMENTATIVE
AND DOES NOT MAKE INNAPPROPRIATE LEGAL CONCLUSIONS.

Canyon Road Towers asserts that various paragraphs of the affidavit of David
Johannessen, submitted in support of summary judgment, failed to comply with the requirements
of Rule 56(e), in that the affidavit was not made on personal knowledge, was not supported by
proper foundation, was argumentative, and/or made legal conclusions. Johannessens deny that
the affidavit was deficient in any material respect.
Canyon Road Towers objects to paragraph 11 of the Affidavit of David Johannessen
claiming that it is not based upon personal knowledge. Specifically, Canyon Road Towers
claims that Mr. Johannessen could not testify that an agreement was reached because he was not
at the meeting of the management committee. To the contrary, Mr. Johannessen received copies
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of the minutes of said meeting and the agreement to lower the assessment was communicated to
him shortly thereafter. (Johannessen Aff, R. at 105-106, Seely Aff, R. at 252) Indeed, through
hours of negotiations with the Board for purchase of unit P9, Johannessens became intimately
aware of the Board's opinions regarding the unit. Id. These negotiations served to provide
Johannessens with sufficient grounds upon which to base his statements in paragraph 11 of his
affidavit. Mr. Johannessen certainly did have personal knowledge of those facts and is testifying
concerning his knowledge of the transaction.
Canyon Road Towers objects to paragraphs 13 and 14 upon the grounds that they are
argumentative and conclusory. In paragraph 13, Mr. Johannessen seeks to simply convey to the
court that subsequent to his purchase, the billings for dues remained the same for a significant
period of time. (Johannessen Aff, R. at 107). Obviously, the Court can form a legal conclusion
concerning the effect of said billings. Likewise, in paragraph 14, Mr. Johannessen simply seeks
to convey to the court that the management committee has since sought to rescind or discontinue
the prior lowered assessment, which Canyon Road Towers does not dispute. Id

Again, the

Court can assess the legal consequences of the management committee's actions.
Canyon Road Towers argues that Mr. Johannessen lacks personal knowledge concerning
the allegations of paragraph 16. Mr. Johannessen has resided in his Canyon Road Towers
condominium since 1992. (Johannessen Aff, R. at 106, Seely Aff., R. at 251). Although not a
member of the management committee, Mr. Johannessen has been reasonably active in the
homeowners association and is generally aware of the committee's actions pertinent to the
building. (Johannessen Aff, R. at 107). In paragraph 16, Mr. Johannessen merely states his
understanding of certain transactions entered into by the committee. Id.
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As demonstrated, the omitted portions of Johannessens's affidavit were based on personal
knowledge, did not make legal conclusions, and maintained appropriate foundation under Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e). As a result, Johannessens's Affidavit in Support of Summary
Judgment should be admissible in its entirety.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court's holding should be reversed and the case
remanded to determine damages.
DATED this if/day of

Um^.A^.

.2001.

J. Gallian
Jf and for
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WELKER
Attorney for Johannessens
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